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Nairobi/Brussels, 27 April 2006: The Congo‚s first free elections in 40 years should 
be a major step toward ending the country‚s long conflict, but if not carried out 
properly, they could trigger further unrest. 
 
The latest briefing from the International Crisis Group, analyses the approaching 
multiparty presidential and legislative elections, the first since 1965, and warns that 
missteps could disrupt the fragile peace. There is potential for electoral fraud, parties 
are relatively weak, and the main opposition group plans to boycott. The considerable 
number of registered political parties’ ˆ some 269 ˆ will likely fragment the opposition 
even further. 
 
The most immediate threat to stability comes from the east. Dissidents from the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), which controlled one third of the country 
during the war and now stands to lose most of its influence, could try to fuel chaos in 
North Kivu in hopes of undermining the polls. Disenfranchised politicians elsewhere 
might also challenge the results violently if the polls are not fair and inclusive. The 
potential for fraud is high, as the security forces and media are deeply politicized and 
there is almost no regulation of campaign finance. The international community and 
the transitional government must act to make sure there is adequate monitoring of 
the whole electoral process. If elections are rigged, the Congolese will suffer the 
consequences for at least five years. 
 
„The population has grown weary of a transitional government that is more 
concerned with personal enrichment than lifting them out of misery, and they are 
counting on the ballot box to improve their lot, says Crisis Group Senior Analyst 
Jason Stearns.If the elections go awry, they will turn once again to violence. 
 
The election date, already postponed five times, is still uncertain. It is unlikely that 
elections can be held by the target of 30 June, and the main opposition party will use 
this delay to stage protests that could turn violent. The electoral commission should 
announce a new, realistic date, which should be not later than 12-13 August, with 
local elections to follow as quickly as possible. The transitional government should 
accept a proposed independent body of respected figures from the region to help 
resolve quarrels between candidates. Congolese officials and the UN mission should 
work together to contain the threat in the east by promoting an open dialogue about 
ethnic reconciliation while isolating and arresting the leaders of the dissidents. Except 
in areas where militia threatens the local population, the army should be garrisoned 
and paid properly through the election period. 
 
‘The Congo‚s stability is at stake’, says Caty Clement, Crisis Group‚s Central Africa 
Project Director. Elections are the first step, but real stability will come only if 
democratic institutions such as courts, media and parliament are given real clout and 
laws are enforced. Congolese will measure the peace dividend by these changes. 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
As the Congo approaches its first free elections in 40 years, the stability of the 
country remains at risk, for three main reasons. First, one of the main former rebel 
groups, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD), is unpopular and stands to lose 
most of its power at the polls: this has triggered a resurgence of violence in the east, 
which is likely to intensify before and after elections, as dissident RCD troops attack 
the newly integrated national army. Secondly, the vote has not been adequately 
prepared. With few safeguards in place against fraud, rigged polls could rapidly 
undermine stability after the elections and produce unrest in cities. Thirdly, the 
country‚s long-time political opposition, Etienne Tshisekedi‚s Union for Democracy 
and Social Progress (UDPS), will boycott the voting, unhappy with the other main 
parties‚ unwillingness to negotiate with it. This is likely to cause unrest in the two 
Kasai provinces and Kinshasa, where Tshisekedi enjoys substantial support. 
 
The east is the most immediate flashpoint. Elections will radically change the political 
landscape. The RCD, whose military wing once controlled over a third of the country, 
will likely go from being a major national player to a small, regional party. This 
probability is tightly linked with fighting in the east, where dissatisfied RCD elements 
remain a security hazard, particularly in the Kivus. In North Kivu, former RCD units 
have refused army integration. Led by Laurent Nkunda, they have repeatedly 
attacked other, integrated units, most recently causing the displacement of 50,000 to 
70,000 civilians around Rutshuru. The fighting has taken on an ethnic tinge, as the 
dissidents are all Congolese Hutu and Tutsi. This has exacerbated tensions within 
the province, where these communities have long-standing land conflicts with other 
ethnic groups. Unless prompt action is taken to address these underlying political 
grievances and to arrest the armed dissidents, further fighting is inevitable. 
 
The potential for electoral fraud is considerable. The ministry of justice has failed to 
push through laws designed to guarantee judicial independence. The courts that will 
need to investigate and adjudicate election disputes remain politicised. A draft law to 
regulate campaign finance has also been shelved. At the same time, former 
belligerents retain parallel chains of command in the security forces charged with 
securing elections and have not been reluctant to influence and intimidate voters. In 
Kinshasa and Lubumbashi, these forces have been used to harass political parties 
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and disperse demonstrations. The national police are poorly trained, and the new 
army is weak, deeply politicised and mostly still not integrated. 
 
The elections are likely to be postponed a sixth time, due to logistical and legislative 
delays, in which case they would be held after the 30 June 2006 deadline established 
by the peace deal. The new constitution adopted by referendum in December 2005 
and promulgated in February 2006 stipulates that transitional institutions remain in 
place until elections are held, suggesting that such a further delay is legally possible. 
However, the UDPS would likely use the missed date to mobilise demonstrations in 
an attempt to upset the process, and other groupings that anticipate poor electoral 
results, like the RCD, might well join. 
 
The question is political, not legal. It is important to complete the electoral process 
without further delay, or at most the minimal delay necessitated by technical 
requirements. Lengthy postponement to extend the privileges of political elites would 
not be acceptable. A realistic date by which to hold presidential and national 
assembly elections if they must be postponed again would be 12-13 August. Efforts 
should be made to maintain a dialogue with the dissatisfied elements, not to permit 
them a veto over the electoral process but in order to preserve the inclusiveness of 
that process to the greatest degree possible and to keep the peace after the 
elections. 
 
Elections are a step in the right direction, but if not carried out properly they could 
trigger further unrest. If the population and leaders conclude change cannot come 
peacefully through the ballot box, they may well resort to violence to contest the 
results. The transitional authorities and the international community have the 
responsibility to ensure that these elections ˆ the first with multiparty choices since 




To the Transitional Government of the Democratic Republic of the Congo: 
 
1.  Hold the first round of the presidential and national assembly elections no later 
than 12-13 August 2006 and complete the electoral cycle by holding local elections 
as quickly thereafter as possible. 
 
2.  Promptly provide a plan for the distribution of ballots and voting materials to avoid 
further delays in the electoral calendar and ensure free and fair elections. 
 
3.  Accept an independent body to help resolve quarrels between candidates during 
the electoral period, such as the „committee of the wise‰ proposed by the UN 
Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUC), which would be 
composed of eminent officials from the region and act in close coordination with the 
electoral commission. 
 
4.  Commit to an early census after the elections and to redistribution of 
parliamentary seats in accordance with its results. 
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5.  Deploy the presidential guard to cities only immediately before a presidential visit 
and withdraw it immediately thereafter so it cannot be used to influence the electoral 
process unduly, and withdraw it also from Kindu, Kisangani and Mbandaka, where it 
has committed numerous human rights violations. 
 
6.  Keep the army in its garrisons during the election period, except for border areas 
and places where militia seriously threaten the local population. 
 
7.  Give the High Authority of the Media sufficient resources to monitor and resolve 
disputes over media activity during the electoral process, including opening offices 
with sufficient and properly funded staff in all provinces. 
 
8.  Give the courts sufficient resources to monitor and resolve election disputes, 
including for the Supreme Court to send more judges to its provincial branch offices. 
 
9.  Discuss the report of the Lutundula commission on war-time contracts and 
publicise its findings widely. 
 
10. Encourage the political parties to publicise their finances widely, including in the 
media. 
 
11. Demonstrate commitment to implement the objective of the new constitution to 
achieve gender parity in national, provincial and local institutions by including all 
stakeholders, particularly women, in the electoral process, including by encouraging 
all parties to discuss gender issues in their platforms and otherwise acting to ensure 
significant representation of women in elected bodies. 
 
12. Deal with the dissidents in North and South Kivu by both peaceful and military 
means: 
 
(a)  Establish a land tenure commission and strengthen the land registry to prevent 
future disputes; 
 
(b)  Discuss ethnic reconciliation openly in the east during the electoral campaign; 
and 
 
(c)  Ensure that all army brigades are adequately fed and paid so they no longer 
present a security hazard and use the integrated brigades to arrest notorious trouble 
makers, such as Laurent Nkunda, in coordination with MONUC. 
 
To political parties participating in the elections: 
 
13. Agree to make every effort to nominate women for at least 20 per cent of the 
appointive positions in government, judicial and public administration bodies, 






To the Members of the International Committee for Support of the Transition 
(CIAT): 
 
14. Support creation of a body of eminent, independent personalities from the Central 
Africa region that can help resolve quarrels between parties during the electoral 
period, along the lines of the „committee of the wise‰ proposed by MONUC. 
 
15. Visit Goma, Bukavu and Uvira to speak with local authorities about the growing 
unrest in the Kivus and support a genuine mechanism for local reconciliation. 
 
16. Strengthen the judicial system by financing deployment of more judges to the 
Supreme Court‚s provincial branch offices and provide them with adequate resources 
to process electoral disputes. 
 
To the Independent Electoral Commission and Observers from Congolese Civil 
Society Groups and Foreign Missions: 
 
17. Coordinate efforts so that observers are present at the largest possible number of 
polling stations. 
 
To the United Nations Security Council, the Secretary-General and MONUC: 
 
18. Devise a coherent strategy for dealing with the insurgents in North Kivu that: 
 
(a)  Addresses the grievances of the local communities, in particular land tenure 
problems, and helps the local and national government set up a commission to 
explore more effective dispute settlement mechanisms; 
 
(b)  Reinforces the legal system so it can impartially investigate human rights abuses 
and demarcates land holdings in the province; and 
 
(c)  Prepares with the Congolese army an operation to arrest Laurent Nkunda, using 




19. Consider creating a fund to support the campaigns of women candidates, 
including through training and financial assistance. 
 
Nairobi/Brussels, 27 April 2006 
 
